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INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0853
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1563
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1982
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0332
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0890
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0835

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 001153

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF, D, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [PREF](#) [ASEC](#) [CD](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR NEW SUDANESE REFUGEES
INTO CHAD

REF: STATE 144652

Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) and (D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UNHCR is concerned that it will be unable to handle a massive influx of Sudanese refugees into Eastern Chad. The lack of viable camp sites (with adequate access, water sources, and assurances of security), along with UNHCR's own resource constraints, will hinder the organization's ability to sustain humanitarian operations.
END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) In response to reftel, Embassy N'Djamena met with representatives of the U.N. High Commission of Refugees, various international partner organizations, and GOC officials, to discuss the current contingency planning for a possible influx of Sudanese refugees who may be fleeing renewed violence in Darfur.

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LACK OF VIABLE CAMPS
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¶3. (C) UNHCR's Country Director Serge Male told Economic/Consular officer on September 8 that UNHCR is currently planning for the possibility of refugee flows ranging from 50,000 to 70,000 refugees into Chad should the violence in Darfur escalate. According to him, while UNHCR and partner organizations could mobilize their resources for a short-term effort, the long-term sustainability of the operations was a question mark. Male pointed out that UNHCR would be hard-pressed to find adequate camp sites that satisfied UNHCR's basic criteria for viability: 1) adequate sources of water 2) sufficient access to the camp 3) capacity for security 4) ethnic compatibility with the host population.

¶4. (SBU) Currently, UNHCR was having difficulty finding adequate water sources in eastern Chad, as most of the water in the region was mixed with clay. Any increase in refugees would mean an increased need for water, which UNHCR would be unable to provide in the long-run. At the same time, those sites that had adequate water sources were difficult to access by ground transportation. Finally, assuming renewed fighting affects security along the Chad-Sudan border, any new sites would have to be developed further west and away

from the border, significantly increasing the potential for ethnic strife between the refugee and local populations.

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REFUGEE PROCESSING
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15. (SBU) Male pointed out that a well-established system was already in place to handle the processing and registration of new refugees. However, a new influx would undoubtedly test the existing structures. After all, more refugees would require more humanitarian workers to handle the processing, registration, and distribution of materials to the refugee population. This would be particularly true in the Oure Cassoni camps in Bahai, which already had a limited staff.

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INSECURITY WILL AFFECT ASSISTANCE EFFORTS
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16. (C) Male also said that should the security situation deteriorate in Eastern Chad, humanitarian operations would be severely impacted. The possibilities for fighting between Chadian rebels and GOC forces, or a spillover of fighting in the east from the recent offensives by the Sudanese Armed Forces, would put the safety of humanitarian workers and the refugee population at risk. While UNHCR was committed to assistance efforts for any influx of Sudanese refugees, if the security of the humanitarian population was not ensured, UNHCR could not justify continuing refugee operations in Eastern Chad.

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QUESTION OF FOOD SUPPLIES
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17. (SBU) World Food Program representative Felix Bamezon told Ambassador Wall on September 18 that the organization was also making contingency plans to prepare for a refugee influx. WFP field officers in camps in eastern Chad were examining current food stock levels, storage capabilities in new refugee camps, and vehicles and communications equipment for staff and distribution partners. Bamezon said that while WFP was not sure of the exact needs for the organization, it would convey its findings to Geneva to ensure that adequate resources could be obtained to cope with the influx. This would possibly involve borrowing from the existing working capital fund in anticipation that future donor assistance would be forthcoming.

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GOC'S OWN CAPACITY FOR REFUGEE PROTECTION
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18. (C) In meetings with DAS Yamamoto and Ambassador Wall, Prime Minister Yaodminadji and Foreign Minister Allam-mi have stated that UNHCR would receive an adequate number of gendarmes for protection of the refugee camps. However, UNHCR continue to highlight the GOC's inability to commit gendarmes that they agreed to provide based on the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government and UNHCR. They also note that should fighting continue in the East, the number of gendarmes given to UNHCR will be less, as the GOC will most likely use those military assets for defense of the eastern front.

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COMMENT
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19. (C) Contingency planning for UNHCR and partner organizations is currently at a very nascent stage, primarily because the humanitarian organizations are not aware of the numbers to expect, and what resources are actually needed to handle the influx. The specifics on the needs should be clearer in the coming weeks. What is obvious, on a general

level, is even with more resources, the logistical planning for a refugee influx will be an extremely difficult task.

¶10. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.

WALL